The risk of a double-dip recession is rising

The risk of a double-dip recession is rising

By Nouriel Roubini

Published: August 23 2009 18:55 | Last updated: August 23 2009 18:55

T  he global economy is starting to bottom out from the worst recession and financial crisis since the Great Depression. In the fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009 the rate at which most advanced economies were contracting was similar to the gross domestic product free-fall in the early stage of the Depression. Then, late last year, policymakers who had been behind the curve finally started to use most of the weapons in their arsenal.

That effort worked and the free-fall of economic activity eased. There are three open questions now on the outlook. When will the global recession be over? What will be the shape of the economic recovery? Are there risks of a relapse?

On the first question it looks like the global economy will bottom out in the second half of 2009. In many advanced economies (the US, UK, Spain, Italy and other eurozone members) and some emerging market economies (mostly in Europe) the recession will not be formally over before the end of the year, as green shoots are still mixed with weeds. In some other advanced economies (Australia, Germany, France and Japan) and most emerging markets (China, India, Brazil and other parts of Asia and Latin America) the recovery has already started.

On the second issue the debate is between those – most of the economic consensus – who expect a V-shaped recovery with a rapid return to growth and those – like myself – who believe it will be U-shaped, anaemic and below trend for at least a couple of years, after a couple of quarters of rapid growth driven by the restocking of inventories and a recovery of production from near Depression levels.

There are several arguments for a weak U-shaped recovery . Employment is still falling sharply in the US and elsewhere – in advanced economies, unemployment will be above 10 per cent by 2010. This is bad news for demand and bank losses, but also for workers’ skills, a key factor behind long-term labour productivity growth.

Second, this is a crisis of solvency, not just liquidity, but true deleveraging has not begun yet because the losses of financial institutions have been socialised and put on government balance sheets. This limits the ability of banks to lend, households to spend and companies to invest.

Third, in countries running current account deficits, consumers need to cut spending and save much more, yet debt-burdened consumers face a wealth shock from falling home prices and stock markets and shrinking incomes and employment.

Fourth, the financial system – despite the policy support – is still severely damaged. Most of the shadow banking system has disappeared, and traditional banks are saddled with trillions of dollars in expected losses on loans and securities while still being seriously undercapitalised.

Fifth, weak profitability – owing to high debts and default risks, low growth and persistent deflationary pressures on corporate margins – will constrain companies’ willingness to produce, hire workers and invest.

Sixth, the releveraging of the public sector through its build-up of large fiscal deficits risks crowding out a recovery in private sector spending. The effects of the policy stimulus, moreover, will fizzle out by early next year, requiring greater private demand to support continued growth.

Seventh, the reduction of global imbalances implies that the current account deficits of profligate economies, such as the US, will narrow the surpluses of countries that over-save (China and other emerging markets, Germany and Japan). But if domestic demand does not grow fast enough in surplus countries, this will lead to a weaker recovery in global growth.

There are also now two reasons why there is a rising risk of a double-dip W-shaped recession. For a start, there are risks associated with exit strategies from the massive monetary and fiscal easing: policymakers are damned if they do and damned if they don’t. If they take large fiscal deficits seriously and raise taxes, cut spending and mop up excess liquidity soon, they would undermine recovery and tip the economy back into stag-deflation (recession and deflation).

But if they maintain large budget deficits, bond market vigilantes will punish policymakers. Then, inflationary expectations will increase, long-term government bond yields would rise and borrowing rates will go up sharply, leading to stagflation.

Another reason to fear a double-dip recession is that oil, energy and food prices are now rising faster than economic fundamentals warrant, and could be driven higher by excessive liquidity chasing assets and by speculative demand. Last year, oil at $145 a barrel was a tipping point for the global economy, as it created negative terms of trade and a disposable income shock for oil importing economies. The global economy could not withstand another contractionary shock if similar speculation drives oil rapidly towards $100 a barrel.

In summary, the recovery is likely to be anaemic and below trend in advanced economies and there is a big risk of a double-dip recession.

The writer is professor of economics at the Stern School of Business, NYU

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羅比尼專欄／新興經濟體 底子硬復甦快

【經濟日報╱羅比尼（Nouriel Roubini）／編譯劉道捷】 2009.08.24 04:15 am

上周我評估那些國家最能熬過全球經濟衰退和信用危機，發現所有國家都受到信用危機影響，但若干國家配合堅強基本面，推動因應危機政策，獲得相對優勢，若干新興經濟體尤其如此。這種優勢可能促使我強調的下列國家，在全球經濟復甦中表現優異。 這些國家有什麼共通之處？重點之一是金融風險較低，國內市場比較大、比較強勁。此外，這些國家有能力推動財政與貨幣政策，對抗景氣衰退，和大肆舉債消費的國家大相逕庭。不過這些國家雖然地位優越，能否恢復永續成長，還是要看他們能否推動結構改革而定。 亞太國家──中國大陸 中國靠著強力財政與貨幣刺激，促使去年底幾乎停滯不前的經濟恢復加速成長，但政府的反應是否只是爭取時間，現在還不清楚。中國的振興措施自有風險，包括資 產泡沫、產能過剩和呆帳問題，但跡象顯示國內需求比預期有力。振興經濟措施以基礎建設為主，下半年或明年仍有繼續刺激經濟的空間，如此應可為其他國家提供 更多支撐，否則，中國和全球經濟成長可能大為不振。 澳洲 澳洲靠著運氣與政策，驚險逃過衰退。全球製造業低迷情勢，但中國和其他新興市場國家繼續利用澳洲豐富的天然資源，使澳洲今年淨出口得以成長。同時澳洲財政支出大增、政策利率下降，阻止消費者支出與房價急劇下跌。 澳洲靠著出口與國內需求兩大經濟支柱支撐，今年第一季就恢復經濟成長，但仍然處在實質衰退中。 全球生產觸底對澳洲是好消息，顯示澳洲今年可以避免衰退、實質衰退期間也會很短。 印度 印度今年可以創造接近6%的經濟成長。印度國內儲蓄、企業保留盈餘與消費基礎龐大，出口依賴程度低落，鄉村就業與所得所占比率居高不下等因素，都有助於印 度維持消費水準。政府及時推出因應危機對策、金融體系大致與外國隔絕、資訊出口大致能夠維持、外匯存底雄厚、投資報酬率優厚等條件，使印度可以繼續吸引外 資。 印尼 全球衰退與商品修正打擊印尼出口，幸好出口占國內生產毛額比率低落，經濟相當依賴國內消費，中國振興經濟，使印尼得以增加商品出口。 政府推動財政刺激政策、推行貨幣、信用與外匯措施，都有助於維持民間需求與融資需要。 印尼金融情勢相當穩定、改革繼續推動、資源部門仍有投資機會，是印尼能夠繼續吸引外資的原因。 北美──加拿大 加拿大財政健全，去年與今年初經濟表現領先七大工業國，但貿易與投資依賴美國，因此經濟復甦可能比美國慢。但金融部門比較有力、借貸水準與違約比率較低、國內需求重振，應可促使加拿大經濟從2010年開始復甦。 歐洲──法國 法國去年逃過經濟衰退，今年經濟表現可望領先歐盟四大經濟體。法國國內需求主導的成長模式比較平衡，對法國躲過全球經濟衰退相當有幫助。龐大的社會安全網充分支持法國的對抗衰退措施，銀行部門相當健全，地位優越，可以充分支撐歐元區經濟復甦。 挪威 去年第四季挪威經濟陷入負成長，但在先進經濟體中，表現仍然列在中段班，分析師預測挪威經濟今年還會萎縮1至2%，明年可以恢復成長。挪威與眾不同，多年 來一直享有巨額經常帳與預算剩餘，政府應用財政與貨幣政策因應衰退的能力綽綽有餘。因此可能是先進國家中最先復甦、最早提高利率的國家，預期2010年第 二季就會提高利率。 拉丁美洲──巴西 和其他開發中國家相比，巴西經濟頗有彈性，早在今年第一季，消費彈性就展露無遺，但製造業仍然疲弱不振。零售業繼續緩慢因應大為不利的環境，銷售成長率繼 續縮減，不過消費者信心幾乎已經回到危機前的水準，可以支撐消費。央行的貨幣與財政刺激應可協助經濟復甦，基礎建設與住宅興建計畫、汽車工業與資本財銷售 稅務優惠應可支撐勞動市場、擴大國內生產。

Charting the U.S. Economic Recovery: V, U or W?

Charting the U.S. Economic Recovery: V, U or W?

Overview: There are growing debates about the shape of the economic recovery, how long will it take to close the output gap and if the economy will grow above or below potential during the recovery. Some analysts expect policy measures and pent-up demand to drive a V-shaped recovery like the one witnessed after the 1981-82 recession. Others expect sluggish recovery in private demand and structural weaknesses in the economy to lead to a U-shaped recovery. Some analysts forecast that as impact of policy measures fade and inventory adjustments finish, growth might slow again if private demand remains weak, leading to a "double-dip" or a W-shaped recession.

Will Fundamentals Support a V-Shaped Recovery?
* Several economists expect the Zarnowitz rule, which says that deeper recessions are followed by steeper recoveries, to hold during this recovery. As economic variables plunged to record lows during late 2008/early 2009, a pent-up demand can boost growth even of these variables don't go back to their pre-boom levels in the near-term. Under this scenario, GDP growth will revive in H2 2009, posting above-potential growth (3%-5%) for some quarters with the economy slowly moving toward potential growth.
* Economists expect this pent-up demand to come from consumption, home prices, autos, industrial activity and investment. They assume the recession will have no impact on consumer behavior, bank-lending or excess capacity. Despite wealth erosion, households will consume as long as they have positive net worth, rising incomes and debt-restructuring/forgiveness opportunities. Firms low on headcount will begin hiring and investing immediately. Residential investment will rebound.
* Senior Economist James Glassman, JPMorgan: The economy might bounce back quickly growing 3%-4% in the coming quarters due to "pent-up" consumer demand as the equity rally will have positive wealth effects. Fed actions might prevent long periods of high unemployment. (via Bloomberg, August 14, 2009)
* Professor Alan Blinder, Princeton University: Lower potential growth going forward is based on the assumption of slower productivity growth, which might not be true. The economy will grow “closer, but not quite, to 3 percent” ahead. (via Bloomberg, August 14, 2009)
* Vice Chairman Laurence Meyer, Macroeconomic Advisers: There is no evidence that the structural unemployment rate has increased. The economy will grow 3.6% in 2010 and 3.9% in 2011 due to pent-up demand from stabilization in home prices. (via Bloomberg, August 14, 2009)
* Chief Economist Stephen Stanley, RBS: Since housing and auto sales are at “very depressed levels,” they will contribute to growth even if they don’t reach their pre-recession peaks. “There is a lot of pent-up demand [as] consumers are holding off on practically all of their discretionary purchases.” The economy might grow 2.9% in 2010, 4.4% in 2011 and 3.5% in 2012. (via Bloomberg, August 14, 2009)
* Michael Mussa, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics: Policy measures will counter economic shocks and the downturn and will lead to a vigorous recovery. The cyclical turning point will occur in mid-2009 with modest growth in summer 2009 and firm recovery in autumn 2009. Growth will be over 4% (Q4-over-Q4) in 2010. (April 8, 2009)


Will Sluggish Private Demand Lead to a U or W Shaped Recovery?
* Many economists believe that structural constraints to private demand will lead to a sluggish U-shaped recovery.These include: 1) slower credit growth; 2) lower household consumption/higher savings (due to jobless recovery, slower wealth and income growth, deleveraging, subdued home prices and higher taxes); 3) high government debt monetization raising real rates; 4) labor market woes (high structural unemployment, aging population); 4) low possibility of export-led growth due to global recession; 5) high taxes, greater regulation, more protectionism; 6) deleveraging in financial and corporate sector; 7) impact of slower capex, innovation and aging population on total factor productivity.
* Other economists expect policy measures and inventories to temporarily boost growth but believe the economy will fall back into slower growth in late 2010/early 2011 due to fading impact of fiscal stimulus, sluggish private demand, higher commodity prices during recovery, high government debt, less room for fiscal/monetary stimulus, lower credit growth and early withdrawal of stimulus measures. This might lead to a double-dip or a W-shaped recession.
* Under these scenarios, growth is forecast to remain below-potential for some quarters/years at around 1%-2% and it might take several years to close the output gap. The economy grew 3.4% during 1929-2008 and 2.8% during 1997-2008. Some of these economists see the risk of potential growth rate also declining.
* Dr. Roubini: "We are in a deep U-shaped recession [which is] three times longer than the previous two and five times deeper–in terms of cumulative GDP contraction–than the previous two. [A recovery will only begin in 2010] and will be weak given the debt overhang in the household sector, the financial system and the corporate sector...[There is] also a massive releveraging of the public sector with unsustainable fiscal deficits and public debt accumulation...[There will be] a shallow, below-par and below-trend recovery where growth will average about 1% in the next couple of years when potential is probably closer to 2.75%...[T]here is a risk of a double-dip W-shaped recession toward the end of 2010 due to the challenge of getting right the timing and size of the exit strategy for monetary and fiscal policy easing." (May 19, 2009)
* Rischard Berner, managing director, co-head of global economics and Chief U.S. Economist and David Greenlaw, managing director and chief U.S. fixed income economist, Morgan Stanley: "The recovery likely will be bumpy, with surges in output followed by slower growth. Longer term, the recovery will be relatively slow, as financial and economic headwinds are only gradually giving way to tailwinds...Yet the recovery will be sustainable... Neither a ‘W' nor a double-dip are the most likely outcome." (August 13, 2009)
* CEO Mohammad El Erian, PIMCO: Excessive regulation, higher taxation, lower consumption and existence of zombie institutions will constrain the growth of potential output to a "new normal" of 2% or below with an eventual inflationary bias down the road. (May 12, 2009)
* Professor Martin Feldstein, Harvard University: "[T]here is a risk the economy may experience a double-dip contraction." The economy could flatten out or be positive in Q3 2009 and contract again in Q4 2009 as the stimulus' impact wears off and companies finish rebuilding inventories. "There isn’t going to be enough to sustain a really solid recovery." (via The Big Picture, WSJ, July 21, 2009)
* Economists Jan Hatzius and Ed McKelvey, Goldman Sachs: Growth will be below trend in 2010 due to fading stimulus impact, rising savings, tight lending conditions and excess capacity in housing and the rest of the economy. Another shock, such as early withdrawal of stimulus, might pose risk of a double-dip. (July 31, 2009, Report: A Stronger Economy in the Near Term, But)
* Economists Drew T. Matus et al, BoA/Merrill Lynch: A 'square-root' type of recovery looks likely as boost from fiscal stimulus will be muted by constraints on consumer spending. The economy will settle to a new trend growth of 2.5%. (In the Report 'The Shape of Things to Come', May 21, 2009)
* IMF: Financial turmoil characterized by banking crisis are associated with severe and longer downturns with larger impact on growth. The U.S. will grow 0.8% in 2010 (below potential) with a sluggish recovery. Growth will turn sustainably positive only in Q2 2010. Potential output will be weak in the medium term due to higher financing costs. (IMF 2009 Article IV, July 2009)
* Professor Kenneth Rogoff, Harvard University: "[The] next five to seven years won't be like the boom years before the financial crisis. With housing prices likely to be soft for years, credit much tougher to come by [and] unemployment stubbornly high, consumers are likely to remain cautious." Taxes will have to be raised to finance debt and entitlements. (via Washington Post, August 13, 2009)
* Gary Shilling: "The recession will extend into early 2010. Only by then fiscal stimulus will stabilize [consumption and] global financial woes [and] excess home inventories may be absorbed." GDP is forecast to grow 2% in the next decade with growth coming from government spending while growth of consumption, investment and trade will slow. Consumption's share in GDP will fall to 66.5% in 2018 from 71% in 2008 while share of other components in GDP will increase, especially that of government spending. (Via Investors Insight, August 10, 2009)
* Douglas Holtz-Easin, Brookings: Despite better economic data, consumers will take longer to recover as they re-build their wealth, pay higher taxes and face high unemployment and inflation. (via Washington Post, August 13, 2009)
* Congressional Budget Office (CBO): "Many factors will temper the strength of the recovery: the loss of household wealth, the fragility of financial institutions, persistently weak growth in the rest of the world, a surplus of housing units on the market and low utilization of manufac­turing capacity... Even if the economy returns to positive growth in 2009, the loss in output, income and employment during the recession and the next few years will be huge.... The gap in output (7% in 2009-10) will not close until 2013 due to large shortfalls in output over the next few years." (May 21, 2009)
* Bridgewater Associates: "Government actions...are not sufficiently directed at the root problem of excessive indebtedness to produce permanent healing." Labor cost cutting by companies will undermine demand and keep up the pressure on banks because of loan losses. (via Thoughts from the Frontline's May 15, 2009, Issue)

金融回暖，經濟猶寒

金融回暖，經濟猶寒

by Nouriel Roubini

紐約——近三個月，全球資產價格強勁回升：發達經濟體股票市值漲幅已超30%，大多數新興市場漲幅更大。大宗商品——石油、能源和礦產的價格飆升；政府債收益迅速攀升，導致企業信用利差（企業債與政府債收益之差）急劇縮小；振盪（所謂“恐慌指標”）減緩了；美元走弱，表明市場對避險性美元資產的需求減弱了。

然而資產價格的這一波回升是不是由經濟基本面驅動的呢？它是可持續的嗎？這一波股價回升究竟是一輪牛市的開始，還是漫漫熊市里的一輪反彈？

雖然一些經濟資料表明基本面的確有所改善，至少一場蕭條來臨的風險已有所降低，全球衰退在年末觸底的可能性有所加大，風險情緒也有所緩和，但是一些不可持續因素也在發揮顯著的作用。何況，某些資產價格的迅速回升會對全球經濟復蘇構成威脅。所以說，市場向下調整的許多風險因素猶存。

首先，信心和風險厭惡心理都是善變的，新一輪振盪很容易出現，只要宏觀經濟和金融資料意外出現下行苗頭的話——許多人覺得，剛剛露頭的全球復蘇儘管生機勃勃，卻還沒有成熟。

第二，極端寬鬆的貨幣政策（零利率、量化寬鬆、新的信貸供應、新發政府債以及購買缺乏流動性的風險私人資產等措施），連同用來穩定金融系統的巨額開支，會在金融和大宗商品市場吹起新一輪流動性驅動型資產價格泡沫。例如，中國的國有企業輕易獲得大量資金和信貸，正在到處收購股權，囤積大宗商品，遠遠超過其生產所必須。

宏觀經濟基本面差於預期引發調整的風險是明顯存在的。實際上，美國和其他發達經濟體最近的資料意味著，衰退將持續到今年年底。更糟的是，未來的一輪復蘇很可能是有氣無力、極不充分的——實際增長遠低於潛在增長率，持續幾年甚至更久——而私人部門的債務和杠杆負擔，連同激增的公共部門債務，會限制家庭、金融公司及企業放貸、借款、支出、消費和投資的能力。

疲弱的復蘇這一情景令人不安，低增長率和通縮壓力限制了收入和利潤空間，大多數發達經濟體的失業率高達10%，可能導致銀行和金融機構的資產組合中大量累積壞賬和有毒資產，從而引發新的金融休克，這一切都在挑戰V形復蘇的希望。與此同時，若干新興市場已經爆發的金融危機可能會傳染給其他經濟體，進而給全球金融市場造成額外壓力。

有些資產的漲價還會導致經濟形勢二次探底，走出W形。尤其是流動性洪水推高能源價格的速度過快、幅度過大。2008年夏天高油價在促發全球經濟衰退中所扮演的角色不容低估。當時油價超過了140美元/桶，是房價崩盤和金融休克之後壓垮全球經濟的最後一根稻草——它給美國、歐洲、日本、中國和其他石油淨進口國帶來了猛烈的供應衝擊。

與此同時，大多數經濟體的財政赤字不斷擴大，推高了長期政府債的收益。鑒於投資者對全球復蘇有所預期，長期利率上升是一種必然的調整。但還是有一些導致利率上升的因素令人擔憂：大規模預算赤字和債務對主權風險及實際利率會有何種影響；當全球經濟於2010~2011年間復蘇，且通縮壓力消失之時，大規模赤字的貨幣化會不會導致嚴重通脹？政府債收益走高，按揭利率和其他私人證券收益也會隨之走高，從而擠壓私人需求，這反過來也可能對經濟復蘇構成威脅。

所以我的結論是，不能排除2010年下半年或2011年出現這樣的情形：一場100美元/桶以上的油價完美風暴、高企的政府債收益和各國政府為了避免債務再融資而增加稅收，三種因素共同導致一輪新的經濟下行，甚至是二次探底。資產價格從今年3月份的低位回升這一輪有一定的基本面基礎，因為全球金融崩潰和經濟進入蕭條的風險減弱了，信心也得到了恢復。但是這輪回升也有相當大的一部分是缺乏支撐的，因為它的驅動力是“經濟會迅速復蘇到潛在增長水平”這種過度樂觀的預期和過快過猛地推高了油價和股價的流動性泡沫。負面的油價衝擊和過高的政府債收益有可能剪斷復蘇的翅膀，導致資產價格和實體經濟出現新一輪較嚴重的下挫。

A Phantom Economic Recovery

Roubini Project Syndicate Op-Ed: A Phantom Economic Recovery

Nouriel Roubini | Aug 16, 2009

Where is the US and global economy headed? Last year, there were two sides to the debate. One camp argued that the recession in the US would be V-shaped—short and shallow. It would last only eight months, like the two previous recessions of 1990-1991 and 2001, and the world would decouple from the US contraction.

Others, including me, argued that given the excesses of private sector leverage (in households, financial institutions and corporate firms), this would be a U-shaped recession—long and deep. It would last about 24 months, and the world would not decouple from the US contraction.

Today, 20 months into the US recession—a recession that became global in the summer of 2008 with a massive recoupling—the V-shaped decoupling view is out the window. This is the worst US and global recession in 60 years. If the US recession were—as is most likely—to be over at the end of the year, it will have been three times as long and about fives times as deep—in terms of the cumulative decline in output—as the previous two.

Today’s consensus among economists is that the recession is already over, that the US and global economy will rapidly return to growth and that there is no risk of a relapse. Unfortunately, this new consensus could be as wrong now as the defenders of the V-shaped scenario were for the past three years.

Data from the US—rising unemployment, falling household consumption, still declining industrial production and a weak housing market—suggests that the US recession is not over yet. A similar analysis of many other advanced economies suggests that, as in the US, the bottom is quite close, but it has not yet been reached. Most emerging economies may be returning to growth, but they are performing well below their potential.

Moreover, for a number of reasons, growth in the advanced economies is likely to remain anaemic and well below trend for at least a couple of years.

The first reason is likely to create a long-term drag on growth: Households need to deleverage and save more, which will constrain consumption for years.

Second, the financial system— both banks and non-bank institutions—is severely damaged. Lack of robust credit growth will hamper private consumption and investment spending.

Third, the corporate sector faces a glut of capacity, and a weak recovery of profitability is likely if growth is anaemic and deflationary pressures still persist. As a result, businesses are not likely to increase capital spending.

Fourth, the releveraging of the public sector through large fiscal deficits and debt accumulation risks crowding out a recovery in private sector spending. The effects of the policy stimulus, moreover, will fizzle out by early next year, requiring greater private demand to support continued growth.

Domestic private demand, especially consumption, is now weak or falling in over-spending countries (the US, UK, Spain, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand, etc.), while not increasing fast enough in over-saving countries (China, other Asian countries, Germany and Japan, etc.) to compensate for the reduction in these countries’ net exports. Thus, there is a global slackening of aggregate demand relative to the glut of supply capacity, which will impede a robust global economic recovery.

There are also now two reasons to fear a double-dip recession. First, the exit strategy from monetary and fiscal easing could be botched, because policymakers are damned if they do and damned if they don’t. If they take their fiscal deficits (and a potential monetization of these deficits) seriously and raise taxes, reduce spending and mop up excess liquidity, they could undermine the already weak recovery.

But if they maintain large budget deficits and continue to monetize them, at some point—after the current deflationary forces become more subdued—bond markets will revolt. At this point, inflationary expectations will increase, long-term government bond yields will rise and recovery will be crowded out.

A second reason to fear a double-dip recession concerns the fact that oil, energy and food prices may be rising faster than economic fundamentals warrant, and could be driven higher by the wall of liquidity chasing assets, as well as by speculative demand. Last year, oil at $145 a barrel was a tipping point for the global economy, as it created a major income shock for the US, Europe, Japan, China, India and other oil-importing economies. The global economy, barely rising from its knees, could not withstand the contractionary shock if similar speculative forces were to drive oil rapidly towards $100 a barrel.

So, the end of this severe global recession will be closer at the end of this year than it is now, the recovery will be anaemic rather than robust in advanced economies, and there is a rising risk of a double-dip recession. The recent market rallies in stocks, commodities and credit may have gotten ahead of the improvement in the real economy. If so, a correction cannot be too far behind.

©2009 / PROJECT SYNDICATE

Nouriel Roubini is chairman of Roubini Global Economics and a professor at the Stern School of Business, New York University.

(James Saft是路透專欄撰稿人,以下內容僅代表其個人觀點)

撰稿 James Saft 編譯 劉蘭香

路透阿拉巴馬州漢斯維爾8月11日電---美國上周五公布的就業報告優於預期,令投資者歡欣鼓舞,但若一年過後再來看,很有可能會發現當日最重要的經濟數據實際上是鮮有人關注的美國聯邦儲備理事會(美聯儲,FED)消費者信貸報告,因該報告在紐約時間下午三點才姍姍來遲,而當時很多投資者甚至是一些分析師都已經在酒吧裡彈冠相慶了.

據美聯儲報告,過去一年的未償還消費者信貸下降2.8%,創下50多年來最快降速.消費者借款僅在6月就減少逾100億美元,自去年末以來則銳減近600億美元.簡而言之,曾經是全球經濟增長領頭羊的美國消費者在退向牧場,而且很可能在此流連一段時間.

與此同時,我們也應該注意到7月就業人口降幅小於預期,工作時間持穩,以及最大的亮點---失業率實際上從9.5%降至9.4%.就業市場的直線下滑之勢明顯接近尾聲,但著陸區仍巖石密布.

首先,失業率之所以下降,是因為停止找工作的人數上升,從而令該數據增色.毫無疑問其中有些人中了彩票,還有一些人可能進了修道院,但我敢打賭這26.7萬停止找工作的失業民眾中絕大部分都不過是灰了心.

那麼我們為什麼要強調消費者信貸數據?消費者支出占美國經濟活動的70%以上,而美國近些年來的經濟增長越來越多的是受到債務而非投資和儲蓄的推動,所謂債務具體而言就是消費者所借的債務,當然這些債務都被花出去了.

但是現在,即便是在股市狂飆突進的情況下,美國家庭的財務狀況仍很糟糕,人們也越發意識到償還債務才是明智之舉.

還不清楚消費者信貸下降是源於需求匱乏還是由於供應緊張.最有可能的情況是兩者兼而有之;借款人和放貸者都越來越認識到自身的脆弱以及彼此互相刺激所存在的缺陷.

據資產管理公司Comstock Partners,在過去十年,美國每創造1美元國內生產總值(GDP),就要借5.4美元債務,高於1990年代的3.2美元和1970年代的1.7美元.(http://www.comstockfunds.com/default.aspx?act=Newsletter.aspx&category=SpecialReport&newsletterid=1473&menugroup=Home)


**不堪一擊的日本模式**

債務仍在推動GDP的創造,但債主已易人;現在是政府借款和支出替代了消費者和其它民間活動.

這樣也好,只是到了某個時候,若非民間部門再次發力,或者政府推出又一輪刺激性支出計劃,否則若政府或消費者都無力接棒,經濟增長就會陷入停滯---而我認為很有可能出現這種情況.

這正是日本在1997年面臨的情況,當時在經歷數年的赤字支出後,日本在時機未成熟的情況下就開始財政改革,致使該國經濟陷入長期反復發病的境地.

日本當時的債務泡沫是拜企業所賜,泡沫破裂後,日本企業債務相當於GDP的比例從1991年的125%降至2001年的95%.注意兩點:這個過程耗時十年,且債務規模降幅非常之大.

據舊金山聯邦儲備銀行的一份研究報告,若當前債務的大頭---美國家庭按照這個規模來降低財務槓桿,就意味著到2018年底時,債務相當於GDP的比例會從大約130%的近期高點降至100%左右.

償還這麼多債務令人痛苦的一點是,這個過程最好是循序漸進的,即便這意味著到大約2011年的時候就會感覺很煎熬.因為如果人們以很快的速度削減債務,那麼不是會出現違約,從而令銀行和資本中介系統岌岌可危,就是會導致消費和投資急劇減少,從而令經濟之艦沉沒.

因此政府挺身而出了.他們為支撐需求而加大支出,他們向銀行體系伸出援手,方式則既有直接注資,也有間接為那些"大而不能倒"的銀行健康狀況免費承保,且承保規模史無前例.

降低財務槓桿將是一個漫長的過程.盡管當前洋溢著喜慶氛圍,但美國很有可能在不久後就會需要另一輪刺激性支出---肯定是在削減債務這一痛苦過程結束之前.

奧巴馬政府或許能夠就此達成政治性的共識,他們或許也能夠繼續大舉借債,同時又不對其融資市場生態造成太大的破壞.

這些都有可能,甚至是很有可能,但可能性肯定沒有美國股市漲勢所反映出的那麼大.(完)

Four lessons from today's BoE Inflation Report

By Edmund Conway Economics Last updated: August 12th, 2009

I’ll be doing a few pieces of news and analysis for the paper this afternoon, but before I get onto them, here are a few thoughts about the Bank’s Inflation Report today.

1. The market had overstepped itself with its expectations for interest rate hikes.
The report said that according to the markets, traders were pricing in that the Bank would start raising interest rates from their current level of 0.5pc as soon as in the first quarter of next year, lifting them pretty quickly towards over 4pc by 2012. These assumptions were clearly wrong, or so we can judge from a quick look at the inflation projections. As I explained briefly this morning, the key thing here is to compare two charts - the first being the one which shows what the Bank thinks would happen to inflation if rates followed market expectations. This is reproduced below.

The key question is whether the level of inflation in two years’ time is at, or above or below, the 2pc level the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee targets. As you can see, if the Bank did what the market expected and hiked rates up towards 4pc, inflation would come in well below target (NB in this chart the two year point is represented by that vertical broken line).

Does that mean we shouldn’t expect any increases in rates whatsoever over the next two years? Not necessarily. To see why, look at the chart which sets out where inflation will go if rates were kept constant at 0.5pc.

This chart (the timescale is slightly different, in that it ends where that broken vertical line was on the one above, ie in two years’ time) shows that inflation would be ever so slightly above target in by mid 2011. The message, then, is that at some point monetary policy will certainly have to tighten, but not by half as much as the market is anticipating.
Whether this implies interest rate increases or plain withdrawal of quantitative easing is another good question. The answer is we simply don’t know, though the Bank has indicated that the process could involve a combination of selling back gilts into the market and raising rates (though it is well aware that pumping back gilts when the Government is already selling so many of them in the coming years could cause unwanted indigestion).

2. The Bank was worried about the threat of deflation and the risk of Britain “becoming a Japan”
As we wrote in a couple of stories over the past days, the rationale at the Bank for pumping extra cash into the economy really did surround these prospects. As the report says: “At its August meeting, the Committee noted that the immediate prospect was for CPI inflation to fall substantially below the 2pc target…. the margin of spare capacity in the economy was likely to continue to grow for some while, bearing down on inflation.” This was its broad rationale for pumping an extra £50bn into the economy - though we’ll learn more in next week’s minutes.

King also admitted, tellingly, that he had consulted with his counterparts in the Bank of Japan specifically about how to avoid making the same mistakes, saying it is essential for policymakers to do so, as “we definitely do not want a wasted decade.”

He then added that he thought the UK had responded better in two ways: the BoE had cut rates sooner and the Government had done a better and faster job in cleaning up the banking system. More precisely, he said: “The banking system has to be fixed. The banks will end up with much higher levels of capital than they had going into this crisis. We’re very conscious of the Japanese experience. We do not intend to go down the same road.”

On deflation, it was telling that he warned that although inflation will pick up this year, price growth is more than likely to drop down below the 1pc level, meaning he is forced to write a letter of explanation to the Chancellor this autumn.

3. Banks remain in deep trouble.

Another part of the rationale for pumping more cash into the economy, and for this gloomy outlook, is that the financial sector is still far from healthy. Indeed, King said it would be a number of years before it recovers fully, saying: “What we have to do is to recognise that the banking sector is still in a very bad way, and it will take several years for it to repair its balance sheets, to get back to the point when it will be weaned off very large amounts of public support and in a position again to lend normally.”

This has significant consequences: if banks are still charging high mark-ups on their loans, it will make the BoE more reluctant to raise rates sooner, since even 1.5pc Bank rate will translate into a painfully high mortgage rate. The problem, he indicated again, is that banks are too undercapitalised to be able to lend out money at a reasonable rate. However, he denied that this was anything the Bank can do much about. Indeed, it is the Government’s responsibility to decide whether it needs to pump more capital into their accounts (and given this would imply possible wholesale nationalisation of some banks, one hardly suspects it would be likely).

4. Watch out for the fiscal squeeze

Bear in mind that neither the inflation or growth forecasts factor in the likely scale of tax rises/spending cuts that will come into force after the election. The projections are based on the plans laid out in the Budget, plans which according to almost every economic authority, including King himself, are not ambitious enough. But if, as most expect, the next Government does indeed tighten their plans, it will imply weaker economic growth and weaker inflation as this feeds through to the wider economy. Therefore it is probably fair to assume that the inflation projection is a wee bit higher than it should otherwise be. This supports the view that the Bank will almost certainly be loth to raise borrowing costs ahead of the next election - because there is a large chance that what follows the election will be a pretty horrendous bout of government austerity.