2009年9月29日 星期二

《全球金融分析》G20提高銀行業資本要求,各國如何執行將是持久戰

16:38 29Sep09 RTRS-

* 美系銀行似乎較歐洲同業佔據優勢
* 美國和法國遊說團體已表達反對
* G20財長將在11月初再度會晤
記者 Kevin Drawbaugh 編譯 田建華
路透華盛頓9月28日電---20國集團(G20)宣言已發佈,關於銀行業資本標準的馬拉松之戰即可鳴槍起跑,美國和法國的行業遊說團體已然開始動作.
這場爭鬥將至少持續至2012年底.銀行家將與各國當局博弈,後者致力於執行G20領導人上周在匹茲堡設定的目標規則.
摩根士丹利分析師周一表示,在符合和管理資本、流動性和槓桿比例等新標準方面,歐洲銀行業面臨的挑戰將比美國同業來得多.
摩根士丹利分析師Betsy Graseck和Huw van Steenis撰寫的報告指出,"我們認為,在為適應G20勾畫出的新監管環境而調整自身資產負債表之路上,美國大型銀行已進境頗多."
這兩位分析師稱,"美系銀行當前的資本狀況好於歐洲同業."
報告挑選的頂尖美國大型銀行包括美國銀行(Bank of America)、摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase)、紐約梅隆銀行(Bank of New York Mellon)、富國銀行(Wells Fargo)和PNC Financial Services.
法國銀行協會周一表示,應該從經濟成本的角度權衡G20設定的目標.
無獨有偶,美國一金融服務游說團體--證券行業和金融市場聯盟則提出警告稱,提出的改革措施"或將對投資者、資本流動和經濟增長產生負面影響."
去年的危機衝擊全球金融體系幾近崩潰,全球各國領導人正試圖阻止危機重演.上周五G20峰會公報敦促加強對銀行業和資本市場的監管,目標不僅瞄準資產負債表,還指向銀行高管薪金以及獎金.
但是G20並無制定法律的權力.而口頭要求和實際行動則是兩碼事.
"誰都可以發表聲明,實際問題是他們能否真正去做,"投資公司FBR Capital Markets銀行業分析師Paul Miller稱.

**執行靠各國**
執行G20的規定有賴於各國領導人、立法人士和監管者.大量的游說組織正不遺餘力地為保護銀行利潤率免受侵蝕而積極努力.
像匹茲堡這樣的峰會"是最佳的放話場所.但不會出台任何制約性的規則,"達特茅斯塔克商學院企業治理中心主任Espen Eckbo表示.
"涉及到銀行業監管,起決定性作用的因素是各國國內機構和銀行領域."
G20呼籲在2010年底前制定更高的資本標準,並在2012年底前執行.不過G20還表示,可以隨著時間推移而逐步執行資本標準,以免這些標準的實施會延長經濟衰退的時間.
G20財長定於11月初在蘇格蘭再次會面.
考慮到此次危機的嚴重程度,建立新標準已是勢在必行.真正的問題是標準尺度有多高.一些分析師預計這會長期拖累銀行股股價,一些銀行核心業務模式會進行調整.

"假以時日,(銀行業)與計入市場風險在內的業務活動相關的資本比例將上升,資本要求更嚴格."Exane BNP Paribas業內分析師Ian Gordon表示.
"整體的效果就是資本比例高於歷史水準,因此股權回報率降低."
然而,G20目標能達成多少,主要還是看銀行業影響實質措施的能力有多強.
摩根士丹利分析師稱,"一些評論人士認為會實施相當嚴格的標準,會將(股權回報率)降至僅高於資本成本的水準.我們認為不會這樣...預計監管機構會務實操作."(完)

可以寫的素材

1.觀察通貨膨脹的方法--.未來可能有資產泡沫,但是沒有通膨;但是新興市場通膨風險較高(因為工資快速成長)+熱錢流入=>可能是下一波泡沫的來源

2.IMF的最新報告(2009.10)-->未來央行貨幣政策將進一步考慮資產價格風險,央行可能先採取行動抑制資產泡沫以免危及金融系統穩定,即使通膨受到良好的控制。

3.G20要求銀行業提高資本對全球金融業的影響

4.各國匯率政策的轉向-->英國:弱勢英鎊+日本:強勢日圓

5.rebalance-->US需要外需,EM需要內需

2009年9月25日 星期五

新聞發布173 號(中央銀行理監事聯席會議決議)

中央銀行理監事聯席會議決議

一、本( 24 )日本行理事會決議如下:

本行重貼現率、擔保放款融通利率及短期融通利率分別維持年息1.25%、1.625%及3.5%不變。

二、本(98)年以來,在振興經濟措施及寬鬆貨幣政策持續激勵下,先進國家及亞洲經濟多觸底回溫,惟預期國際景氣復甦力道和緩。本月初國際貨幣基金(IMF)分別上修今、明兩年全球經濟成長率至-1.3%及2.9%。

三、本年第2季國內經濟衰退趨緩,經濟成長率上修為-7.54%;若經季節調整後之季變動率折成年率(saar),則達20.69%,台灣為亞洲地區快速回升的經濟體之一。

近期外銷訂單、工業生產、零售業營業額、產能利用率等經濟數據好轉;加以政府全力推動公共建設,災後重建亦積極展開,行政院主計處預估,第4季與上年同季比較之經濟成長率將轉呈正成長,明(99)年經濟成長率則預估由本年之-4.04%升為3.92%;就業人數雖連續5個月增加,惟失業率仍高。

四、本年以來,國際原油等原物料價格仍較上年同期大幅下滑,致1至8月國內消費者物價(CPI)略跌0.72%,核心CPI則略漲0.23%。主計處預測本年CPI年增率為-0.68%,明年將升為0.87%,物價維持低且穩定。

五、與上年同期比較,本年1至8月貨幣數量M2平均年增率為7.30%,略高於本年貨幣成長目標區;惟若經季調後與上年12月比較,則8月年增率為6.37% (詳附件)。銀行授信因企業資金需求不強,1至8月平均年增率降為1.16%,惟仍高於上半年經濟成長率-8.84%,顯示銀行授信仍足以支應經濟活動所需。金融市場長短期利率維持在歷史低點,有助企業及個人減輕資金成本,增加投資及消費。

六、經審慎考量前述國內外總體經濟金融情勢,本行理事會認為當前政策利率尚屬合宜,貨幣數量亦維持合理成長,有助於支撐經濟復甦,且不致形成通膨壓力。未來本行將視國內外經濟金融情勢,適時採行妥適之貨幣政策。

七、近來新台幣對美元升值,主要係美元對主要貨幣走弱所致。新台幣匯率採管理浮動制度,原則上由外匯市場供需決定;若有不規則因素(如熱錢大量進出)及季節因素導致匯率過度波動時,本行將維持外匯市場秩序。此亦符合聯合國貿易發展會議9月初年度報告建議「開放資本帳之新興經濟體採行管理浮動匯率制度,較能有效吸收外部衝擊」。

Asian Growth Outlook for 2009-2010

Overview: Most of Asian economies released stronger-than-expected Q2 2009 GDP figures, showing a V-shaped recovery may be in the cards. Relatively strong macroeconomic fundamental and initial conditions, aggressive fiscal and monetary policies and surging capital inflows all support this argument. Despite some improvements, real economic conditions remain fragile. Exports are falling at double-digit rates for most of countries, though the contraction has eased somewhat thanks to inventory restocking. Consumption remains weak due to negative wealth effects amid worsening labor market condition. Investment is declining sharply, reflecting tight credit condition and still-weak demand at home and abroad. Government spending was largely insufficient to support growth. Therefore, economic activity is expected to remain weak in H2 2009 and 2010, considering stimulus effects begin to fade and private sector deleveraging in advanced economies will continue to keep both exports and investment weak. Asian economies will recover on a sustained basis, accompanied by any meaningful revival in external demand in the advanced economies.

Asia's Recovery Prospects Hinge on G3 Recovery?
* ADB: "Asia will lead the recovery from the global slowdown" on the back of aggressive monetary and fiscal stimulus measures, relatively strong financial systems, faster-than-expected rebounds in less-export dependent countries. However, the recovery might be hampered by a prolonged global recession or an earlier-than-expected withdrawal of stimulus measures. Developing Asia is expected to grow by 3.9% in 2009 and 6.4% in 2010. (Asian Development Outlook; September 22, 2009)
* IMF: The growth forecast of Emerging Asia has improved, driven by better prospects in both China and India and a faster-than-expected turnaround in capital flows. But the acceleration in growth hinges critically on the recovery in developed economies. Emerging Asia is forecast to grow 5.5% in 2009 and 7% in 2010. Japan will contract sharply at 6% in 2009 but will grow 1.7% in 2010 due to aggressive fiscal policies and strong performance in neighboring Asian economies. (IMF Outlook, July 8, 2009)
* World Bank: Despite aggressive government measures, growth in East Asia and the Pacific will slow to 5% in 2009 from 8% in 2008 due to weak exports and a slowdown in domestic demand. Yet the region will grow the fastest in the world, helped by China. Ultimate recovery depends on the pace of recovery in advanced economies. Growth in 2010 will be relatively subdued at 6.6%. An output gap will persist for several years because of weak labor markets and sluggish consumption. (World Bank Outlook, June 2009)
* FT: "Too early to declare a V-shaped victory." Much of the recovery in the region is created by base-period effect. Domestic demand is still-weak and fiscal stimulus cannot be rolled out as it would create risks of overcapacity, asset price inflation and damage to the financial system (July 26, 2009). In addition, Asia has flunked the longer-term economic rebalancing, evidenced by still-weak domestic demand. The current account surplus has widened as imports fall faster than exports. Central banks are intervening FX markets to prevent currency appreciation amid exports slump. (Lex, July 23, 2009)
* EIU: Asia's growth will slow sharply to 2.4% in 2009 due to high export dependence and risks to investment and employment. The recovery will be subdued in 2010, growing by a mere 4.6%. This will be due to weak demand in advanced economies, tight access to credit and risk of capital flight, despite some improvement in global risk appetite. Aggressive loosening of monetary and fiscal policies will support growth and ensure a U-shaped recovery in the region. (July 17, 2009)
* Analyst Tomo Kinoshita, Nomura: Asian economies will recover 2008 GDP levels in 2011. "As Asian economies reach full-employment conditions and thus close the output gap in 2011, the driver of investment growth should shift from public investment initiated by fiscal stimulus in 2009 to private investment in 2011." (August 7, 2009)
* Johanna Chau, Head of Asia Pacific, Citi: Asia's recovery is V-shaped, backed by aggressive policy stimulus, export inventory restocking cycle for tech, sharp inflation collapse and some help from incremental demand from China. But the upturn may not be strong as deleveraging in the advanced economies will reduce the region's potential growth, especially for countries more dependent to previously credit-fueled exports markets, including Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan. (July 24, 2009)
* Paul Gruenwald, Chief Economist Asia, ANZ: Emerging Asia's recovery path will depend on a combination of demand momentum, export dependency and the likely effectiveness of fiscal policy. But Asia will be unable to recover without a resumption of external demand in the advanced economies. (July 3, 2009)
* Analyst David Carbon, DBS: A V-shaped recovery is taking place in Asia as the drivers of downturn were "one-off" in nature not the "fundamental weakness." (June 11, 2009)
* Analysts Chetan Ahya and Deti Tan, Morgan Stanley: Growth will bottom out in H1 2009, with muted recovery in H2 2009. (January 16, 2009)
* Analysts Bill Belchere and Rajeev Malik, Macquarie: The U.S. recession will have a greater impact on Asia than the 2001 recession, with Asian exports and countries with high external financing needs (South Korea, India and China) taking a big hit. (March 13, 2009)
* 2009 AXJ GDP Growth Forecasts: Nomura: 4.9% | Citi: 4.6%| ANZ: 3.8% | EIU: 2.4% | RGE Monitor: 4.3%
* 2010 AXJ GDP Growth Forecasts: Nomura: 7.7% | Citi: 7% | ANZ: 6.5% | EIU: 4.6% | RGE Monitor: 6.2%

What Are Risks to Growth?

* Domestic Demand: Consumer spending has improved in some countries because of stimulus measures. But in most Asian Tigers and ASEAN countries, consumption is contracting or slowing sharply due to negative wealth effects from large job losses in manufacturing and export-related sectors. Investment is contracting or slowing sharply in most Asian Tigers and ASEAN countries due to plunging foreign direct investment (FDI) and exports, lower corporate earnings and tight credit.
* Exports: Exports contracted sharply across Asia in H1 2009 due to lower demand from the G-3, though industrial production turned around in many Asian countries. China's stimulus spending in 2009 is mostly geared toward infrastructure. So most Asian countries that export parts and components to China for re-export to the G-3 countries will not benefit. Benefits to Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam will be limited as they export manufacturing-intensive commodities to China. Asia's exports will remain under pressure until final demand in advanced economies shows a strong and sustained improvement.
* Tight Financial Conditions: Despite aggressive monetary easing and improvement in liquidity conditions, private lending rates remain elevated, and banks see high credit risk lending to corporates and households. Capital-raising activity remains subdued. On the other hand, in countries like Vietnam and China, government stimulus measures are fueling asset bubbles.
* Capital Flows: Foreign institutional investor (FII) inflows are fueling market rallies but are still prone to global risk aversion and volatility in the U.S. markets. FDI will drop in most Asian economies in 2009. Debt inflows are already under pressure because of declining interest-rate differential with the U.S. and rising debt downgrades. A global liquidity crunch is sharply reducing Asia's access to foreign bank capital. Easing external balances and capital outflows may lead to currency depreciation in the region. (Nomura)
* Deflation: Excess capacity in manufacturing, rising unemployment and slowing or contracting domestic demand in many countries are causing deflationary pressures. China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Japan are in technical deflation. Some impact is due to base effects as food and commodity prices are lower relative to 2008. Deflationary pressures might persist until late 2009 or early 2010 due to sluggish economic recovery and large output gaps.
* Fiscal Deficit: Increasing stimulus spending amid withering income-tax- and commodity-related revenues are raising fiscal deficits and public debt. Investor concerns over rising bond issuance and higher longer-end yields are posing risk to debt auctions. Debt ratings of many countries (Japan, India, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Pakistan and Vietnam) have been downgraded or are at risk.
* Political Risk: Political stability has strengthened after elections in India and Indonesia. Thailand and Japan are witnessing increasing political instability exacerbated by the economic downturn. China and Vietnam face the risk of greater social unrest from job losses among migrant and factory workers.

2009年9月23日 星期三

台灣央行召開會議在即,對經濟前景將做何評論 from Reuters

情景推測》台灣央行召開會議在即,對經濟前景將做何評論?
(此文可搭配閱讀《台灣央行觀測站》料第三度宣布重貼現率維持在1.25%的歷史低位[ID:nCT0304805])
記者 高潔如/李千儀
路透台北9月22日電---台灣央行周四(24日)將召開第三季全體理監事會議,市場估計本次央行仍將按兵不動,第三度宣布利率維持在歷史低位1.25%不變.但觀乎全球股市,商品價格已明顯漲升,不少數據也顯露經濟復甦綠芽,央行本次將會對經濟前景做何評論?
去年9月金融風暴爆發後至今年2月止,台灣央行一共連七次調降利率,之後在3月與6月底的理監事會議均宣布重貼現率1.25%不變;針對本次的央行會議,路透訪查11位分析師,全數認為本次央行將維持利率不變.
市場也普遍認為,台灣央行今年升息的可能性相當小,並且台灣央行可能高度參考台灣重要的出口地區--美國、中國以及亞洲其他鄰國如韓國的升息動作,來考慮適當的升息時點.
以下為這次會議台灣央行可能針對數項議題做出的反應:

**稱經濟緩步復甦,但仍存在不確定因素**
台灣央行先前對經濟的評論一貫是"經濟觸底,並走上緩步復甦".本季理監事會議上,央行對經濟前景的看法可能較上次樂觀,但仍可能加註復甦之路並不穩固的但書,藉以宣告台灣未來的升息時點,仍須視數據表現來拿捏.

不過,有鑑於全球經濟復甦力道仍不明朗,台灣的成長重心又在出口,在目前出口衰退明顯趨緩下,央行很可能沿用主計處的估計做為未來經濟預估的基礎--台灣經濟將在第四季恢復正成長5.5%,明年由負成長轉為正成長3.92%.
央行總裁彭淮南在第二季理監事會議中曾表示,要等到GDP、失業率及通膨回到金融海嘯前水準,才會考慮升息.[ID:nCT0282085]
儘管目前經濟情勢已顯現好轉跡象,不過台灣的失業率仍在持續攀高--台灣7月失業率衝破6%大關,達6.01%,不但是連續16個月走高,且已連續數月創下歷史最高紀錄.

**物價持穩**
央行對物價的看法,極可能延續上次理監事會議中表述的基調--物價持穩.
台灣今年1-8月消費者物價指數(CPI)年增率為下跌0.72%,因內需仍弱且全球商品價格大幅下探.至於主計處今年預估台灣全年的物價也將下跌0.7%,尚無通膨疑慮.
儘管9月的食品價格可能受到莫拉克風災影響繼續揚升,且9月CPI較上年同期衰退幅度可能縮小,甚而翻正,但整體而言對物價並不構成威脅.

**貨幣政策持續寬鬆,目前貨幣政策允當**
央行很有可能仍會重申維持寬鬆貨幣政策,且再次說明目前貨幣政策允當.不過,部分市場人士猜測,由於台灣貨幣市場資金仍相當寬鬆,且近期國外熱錢流入讓市場游資更充裕,中央銀行很可能在貨幣市場略微加大沖銷力道,以回收多餘資金.
更進一步地,市場人士認為,除了加大沖銷力道之外,央行若宣布發行一年期存單,即等於更明確告知市場,貨幣政策即將調整的訊息.目前中央銀行發行存單餘額約5.37兆台幣,已處在歷史高位水準.
台灣央行在去年9月金融風暴發生後,即停止發行一年期存單,以確保金融市場流動性充裕.

**密切觀察資產泡沫**
儘管台灣央行以往未對此多所著墨,但本次會議中央行極可能針對此問題做出答覆--將密切觀察資產價格走勢,尤其是房地產市場以及股市的走勢.
自去年9月金融海嘯爆發以來,台灣央行與各國央行聯手調降利率救市.以台灣央行為例,自去年9月至今年2月共七次降息,並維持市場寬鬆的流動性.然而,過多的資金已持續流入非生產面市場,例如股市、大宗商品市場等.
以台股為例,台灣加權股價指數<.TWII>今年以來已強勁揚升60%以上,表現優於亞洲鄰國如香港<.HSI>和韓國股市<.KS11>的上漲五成左右.而台灣房地產市場價格今年以來持續走升,以台北市中古屋價格為例,今年初至今已漲升7.3%,去年全年漲幅僅1.7%,但在去年初至8月底金融風暴前的漲升幅度為12%.
若央行真對資產價格表達關注之意,將意味著升息警訊,這會對市場造成壓力.(完)

值得一讀的演講稿

新聞參考資料(彭總裁接受國立臺北大學榮譽法學博士學位致詞)

中央銀行新聞參考資料 98年6月7日發布

<網址:http://www.cbc.gov.tw>

彭總裁接受國立臺北大學榮譽法學博士學位致詞

侯校長、各位老師、海基會江董事長、校友總會張理事長、各位貴賓、各位同學:

47年前我沒能南下台中校本部參加畢業典禮,多年來深感遺憾!感謝母校給我重回學校參加畢業典禮的機會,一了多年的心願。雖然很多位校友比我個人更值得得到這項榮譽,但感謝母校將這項榮譽頒發給我,讓我深深引以為榮。

個人從母校畢業之後,一直都在銀行界工作;其間在中央銀行服務先後長達36年之久。願藉此機會向各位報告中央銀行的操作,也請各位多多指教。

中央銀行雖然叫做銀行,但跟一般銀行不一樣。一般銀行的客戶是公司行號及個人,央行的客戶是銀行。一般銀行的功能為金融中介,就是將存戶的錢,貸放給借款人從事投資。央行的功能,依我國中央銀行法的規定為:

1、促進金融穩定(英、美中央銀行法沒有這項功能,最近國際清算銀行正建議各國央行的功能應包括促進金融穩定,顯示我國中央銀行法相當先進完備)

2、健全銀行業務

3、維護對內及對外幣值之穩定(所謂對內幣值的穩定就是物價的穩定,對外幣值的穩定就是匯率的穩定)

4、以及在達成上述目標範圍內,協助經濟之發展

各國央行向來重視物價的穩定,近年來不少國家的中央銀行更採行通膨目標機制(inflation targeting)。物價有很多種,央行所關心的物價是核心消費者物價(core CPI),也就是剔除蔬菜、水果及能源的消費者物價。因為蔬菜水果價格受天候的影響,而油價在短期內受OPEC的影響,容易大幅波動。由於貨幣政策從採行到效果的顯現有一段時差,因此央行在釐定貨幣政策時,必須考量未來的物價走勢。

物價係由總需求與總供給共同決定,央行的貨幣政策只是影響總需求的多項因素之一。而物價的上漲有時是需求帶動(demand pull),即需求曲線向右移;有時却是成本推動(cost push),即供給曲線向左移,如進口油價的上漲。

央行的貨幣政策對需求帶動的通膨比較有效果;對成本推動的通膨,採行緊縮性貨幣政策,要付出產出縮減的代價。而且一個國家的經濟對外開放程度越高,貨幣政策的效果也會減弱。

縱使貨幣政策的有效性有時會受到影響,我很高興向大家報告,從1998到2008年,台灣物價上漲率相當的低而且穩定(low and stable inflation)。CPI平均上漲率僅1.2%,而其標準差也只有1.1%;跟其他國家的物價比較,台灣的表現非常良好。

其次,向大家報告外匯操作,分為兩項,首先報告匯率政策。台灣的GDP只有美國的36分之1;進出口佔GDP的比率,美國只有29%,台灣高達138%;台灣跟新加坡一樣是典型的小型而高度開放的經濟(small open economy)。2004至2008年,台灣經濟成長率平均為4.19%,其中,外需的貢獻率高達3.11個百分點。匯率對進出口有顯著的影響力,新加坡就是以匯率作為貨幣政策的中間目標。就台灣而言,匯率的重要性不低於利率。

台灣為了加入WTO,資本帳被迫開放,外資已可自由進出。就實際資料觀察,熱錢經常在特定時段大量進出,干擾了外匯市場的穩定,這是小國家的難處。假如亞洲國家中,經濟發展程度相近、彼此間貿易及資本交易較多的國家,能建立共同通貨區,像歐洲使用歐元一樣,亞洲使用亞元(Asian dollar),這樣就可以降低交易成本、促進經濟成長。亞洲小型經濟體的貨幣,就不會成為國際禿鷹攻擊的對象。

一般商品的供需曲線比較穩定;外匯的供需曲線,很容易受非理性預期心理的影響,而左右移動(shifting)。因此,如任由外匯供需決定匯率的價位,熱錢將扮演主導角色,新台幣匯率每天可能變動好幾塊錢,進出口廠商一定承受不了。

但匯率也必須要有彈性,才不會受投機客的攻擊;如同柔軟的柳樹,在颱風來臨時安然無恙。因此,央行儘可能讓匯率由外匯市場供需決定,只有在不規則因素及季節因素使匯率波動過大的時候,才會進場維持外匯市場的秩序。

近年來,新台幣的實質有效匯率指數維持在36個月移動平均數上下的合理範圍內,顯示新台幣匯率維持動態穩定。此外,從新台幣匯率的反應函數,我們觀察到,當經濟成長率下跌,物價平穩時,新台幣的名目有效匯率指數下降;反之,當經濟成長率升高,物價漲幅擴大時,新台幣的名目有效匯率指數也跟著上升。實證的結果顯示,新台幣的匯率政策有助於台灣總體經濟的穩定。

另外,向大家報告外匯存底的營運。央行管理外匯存底,必須兼顧安全性、流動性及收益率。天下沒有白吃的午餐,要多賺一塊錢,就要多承擔一分風險。如何在報酬與風險之間取得平衡,是一項艱鉅的任務,常會讓人陷入天人交戰的處境,晚上睡不好。為了管理龐大的外匯存底,央行經常從外界進用優秀人才,同時加強同仁的在職訓練,每天都有同仁在國內外受訓進修;並成立研究小組,支援外匯操作,績效相當良好。

多年來,農曆除夕、大年初一,個人都偕同外匯交易員在央行上班,幾天前的端午節也不例外。因為台灣雖然放假,但國際金融市場仍然營業,因此外匯交易員必須上班。對央行同仁的努力及奉獻,個人心存感激。

2007年中,美國房地產泡沫破滅,引發金融危機,進而導致全球經濟衰退。台灣因出口市場集中,又以資訊通信產品(ICT)為主,而且ICT的所得彈性較高,因此出口大幅衰退而使經濟負成長。

面臨嚴峻的經濟衰退,央行積極採行因應措施。為激勵內需,自去年9月26日起,7度調降各項貼放利率,累積降幅達2.375個百分點,以減輕個人及企業的資金成本,並促進民間消費與投資意願。有關利率的調整,要做個補充說明,中央銀行跟財政部不一樣,當財政部調降稅率時,大家都鼓掌贊同;但中央銀行調降利率時,借款人固然高興,存款人却會抱怨。這個時候,我常會收到一些退休老先生寫來埋怨的信,心裡很難過。但基於總體經濟利益的考量,央行仍不得不調降利率。為振興經濟,各國央行也紛紛調降利率。

2009年9月21日 星期一

My book-做個積極的外匯投資人




積極的外匯投資人:全球化時代資產加分的最佳工具

◎外匯與股票有何不同?
◎搞懂升值、貶值
◎外匯投資報酬DIY
◎漢堡也能用來評價匯率!
◎5大熱門外匯投資工具解密
◎7種主要貨幣的現況與展望

  「外匯」或「匯率」看起來與我們的日常生活關連度甚低,但以目前台灣人普遍藏富於海外的理財方式來看,匯率每跳動一個基本點,影響的財富至為可觀。雖然美國聯準會前主席葛林斯班、PIMCO債券基金經理人葛洛斯等,都認為不可能準確預測匯率價位,但透過一些簡單的方法,匯率變動的趨勢方向卻是可以掌握。一旦有了匯率方向,對投資人的理財布局可以說是如虎添翼。作者以簡單的外匯理論,結合在外匯市場的實際操作經驗,將本書分成七個章節,依序介紹:

  ◎基本功夫的修練:介紹外匯市場的形成、匯率的報價、如何計算外匯報酬。

  ◎紮實的理論分析:包括影響外匯市場長短期基本面、心理面等變數探討,以及政府政策對匯率的直接、間接影響。

  ◎熱門外匯投資工具:針對市場上熱門的外匯投資工具詳細解讀優缺點。

  ◎七大貨幣特色簡介:各國的經濟概況、政府政策、匯率展望等條件,剖析市場上常見的七大主要貨幣特色。

作者簡介

李家緯

  台灣證券分析師,英國曼徹斯特管理學院碩士,畢業論文曾與指導教授聯合發表於《亞洲經濟學人期刊》。作者在金融市場的經歷長達10年,負責貨幣市場、固定收益、外匯市場,以及總體經濟分析等交易與研究工作;並曾於上海金融機構擔任投資工作,具有中國銀行同業間交易員執照,目前擔任國內金融機構總體經濟及外匯策略分析師。

2009年9月17日 星期四

《美元匯率分析》美元利差交易行將休矣,因股市回落風險日益增大

記者 Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss/Wanfeng Zhou; 編譯 吳雲凌
路透紐約9月17日電---如果今年全球股市的漲勢消退,那麼用美元融資再買入澳元等高收益貨幣這種高風險的利差交易就可能迅速崩解.
美國聯邦儲備理事會(美聯儲,FED)旨在避免長期內執行緊縮貨幣政策,而將利率降至紀錄低位,加之全球經濟前景的改善,促使投資者在過去幾周的利差交易中賣出美元.
摩根士丹利資本國際公司(MSCI)全球股票指數<.MIWD00000PUS>較今年3月觸及的低點已飆升近70%,亦增大了利差交易的魅力.另一方面,澳元兌美元升幅也達到23%,該貨幣是利差交易的受益者,通常與股市同向波動.
不過美元利差交易的壽命恐怕比多數人設想的要短.因為股市持續回落,會損及利差交易的吸引力.
"所有人涌向股市並在利差交易中出售美元,但背後的動力並非獲利回升,而後者才是價格得以持續上升的支撐因素,"Interactive Brokers資深市場分析師Andrew Wilkinson稱.
在許多地區,經濟數據較不黯淡,也成為利好刺激,股市的反彈和美元的下跌似乎具有了自我強化的性質,盡管對於信貸緊張和銀行放款低迷的憂慮仍未消散.
分析師還指出,利率環境太過不確定,使得美元利差難以長久維繫.他們相信基於日本巨大的產出缺口,日本利差交易將東山再起.
產出缺口指的是經濟中的現有產出與最大潛在產出之間的差值.產出缺口擴大反映在工資的下降和通脹的趨低,這會抑制央行升息的能力.
日本利率多年來維持在低位,有利於進行利差交易,但分析師認為這一幕不會在美元身上重現.
"日本的產出缺口比美國大得多,"Putnam投資公司投資組合經理Paresh Upadhyaya說道,"我不相信美國的低利率能夠維持得足夠久,可夯實美元在多年內成為融資貨幣的基礎."
分析師對美元利差交易壽命的估值是六個月到一年,這與日圓長達10年充當利差交易融資工具的戰功相比真的是微不足道.

**美元/日圓不久或將反彈**
技術指標開始暗示美元賣盤已經過火.
交易商稱,期權市場上歐元三個月看跌期權價格已經高於看漲期權,這顯示隨著歐元的上漲,越來越多投資者開始開始買入下檔保護,以對沖歐元下跌風險.
同時,根據巴克萊資本國際的隱含概率分布數據顯示,市場也認為美元兌日圓上漲的機率很高.
巴克萊的合理價格預估最近一周美元兌日圓下跌0.3%,但實際現匯跌幅為2.6%,反映出美元匯率被低估6.2%,低估程度為過去一年來最大.
這些數據均暗示美元/日圓不久將反彈,因為美元空頭倉位過重.(完)
--譯文審校 龔芳

2009年9月15日 星期二

《KEMP專欄》大宗商品景氣循環突顯央行政策缺失

(John Kemp是路透專欄撰稿人,以下內容僅代表其個人觀點.)
撰稿 John Kemp 編譯 張若琪
路透倫敦9月14日電---過去10年,(從能源、工業金屬到農產品等)範圍極廣的大宗商品價格彼此間(及與美元和股市間)的連動關係,較1970年代以來任何時候都要高.如此強烈的跨商品循環再度引爆外界爭辯,價格是否確由產業基本面、抑或是投機客一回回的廣泛買賣所制定.
就實務上而言,基本面抑或是投機炒作,始終不太可能有結論性的答案.多數分析師會承認兩者都存在其影響力.但過去10年整體大宗商品強烈的價格同步現象,除了特定產業基本面外,其中的確還有更深層的意涵.
在7月公佈的工作報告中,歐洲央行的Isabel Vansteenkiste發現強烈證據顯示有"共同因素"在推動非能源大宗商品的價格.Vansteenkiste暗示,此因素多半可用常見的驅動因素來做解釋:美元價值和美國實質利率的變化,能源和其他投入成本,及最近以全球製造循環.
事實上,這裡每個表面上似乎不相干的因素,其實都表明了貨幣政策和全球流動性的狀況.儘管報告作者謹慎地未加明示,但從2003年到2008年間大宗商品價格見證的同步榮景、然後破滅,都暗示了貨幣政策的缺失,因以美國聯邦儲備理事會(美聯儲,FED)為首的各國央行,容許需求超越全球經濟的供應面能力,直到泡沫爆破.繼之而來的廣泛反彈顯示投資人擔心那些錯誤即將重演.

**共同因素**
Vansteenkiste檢視了從1957年到2008年5月間,食品、農業農物料和工業金屬三大類中32種非燃料大宗商品的每月價格,發現這三大類之內和之間具有價格連動的強烈證據,及明顯的跨商品景氣循環.參閱相關報告請點擊連結:(http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1072.pdf)
1970年代和1980年代初期這種同步現象尤為強烈.但現象在即將接近2000年的幾年間消失.不過在過去九年,同步現象再度轉強,只不過仍不及早20年前水準的一半.
Vansteenkiste估計,從咖啡、椰子油到椰乾、小麥和銅等大宗商品的變異性,有高達40%可以此"共同因素"來解釋(不過糖的情況就較難以此說明).
在檢視造成此共同因素的可能原因時,Vansteenkiste發現其與美元(以貿易加權指數為標準)和美國實質利率的負向連動;與投入成本(以油和肥料價格代表)的正向連動;和較近期的,與經濟合作暨發展組織(OECD)及六個發展中經濟體(俄羅斯、中國、印度、巴西、印尼、南非)工業生產的正向連動.
她做出了結論,認為這些宏觀經濟基本面,而非投機操作,可說明本世紀以來商品價格多數的同步起落現象.

**貨幣政策失誤**
但在1980年代和1990年代的通脹趨緩(disinflation),被再起的產能限制和支持增長傾向的貨幣政策疑慮取代之際,這樣的共同因素重新浮現,真的只是巧合嗎?
事實上,我認為共同因素只是象徵央行貨幣政策的挫敗.在各個央行將焦點放在推低通脹的年代(如美聯儲1980年代初期在沃克爾麾下,及1990年代的格林斯潘時代),這個共同因素消失無蹤.但當官員決定通融商品價格上揚以維護增長(如1970年代和2000年代)時,同步現象再度浮現,商品價格全線上揚,且供不應求.
如果這種解讀無誤,燃料和非燃料大宗商品價格在近10年中間幾年的全面高漲,就象徵了貨幣政策和信貸條件過度寬鬆.縱使在央行因核心通脹率低而感到安心下,能源和其他原物料價格仍暴露出需求過度.

大宗商品價格掌控全球經濟的要害,其價格整體變化是全球通脹和過剩需求的最佳指標,並顯示貨幣政策既無法長久維繫下去,也不恰當.
在此背景下,儘管庫存豐沛,但今年初以來商品價格的同步大漲令人擔憂,因為這顯示投資人預期央行將重蹈覆轍,過長時間維持過於寬鬆的貨幣條件,使得後續為了確立產出復甦而有通脹之虞.

**1930年代前車之鑑**
儘管市場價格未必總能正確指引未來方向,但在這個例子中,投資人對商品價格再度高漲的疑慮可能是準確的.美聯儲和其他各央行向全球經濟挹注如此多流動性,卻未高度重視通脹風險,其情況令人擔憂.
美國聯邦公開市場委員會(FOMC)近期聲明點出了能源價格上揚,但重申其相信其他方面的遲滯情況將在可見的未來壓制通脹率.
美聯儲主席貝南克和白宮經濟顧問委員會主席羅默都曾強調,暫時性的復甦跡象意味需長時間維持刺激政策.
羅默曾明確警示,必須避免重蹈1937年時的覆轍.當時聯儲為因應銀行體系過度流動性正助長通脹的疑慮,特別是在鋼價的飆漲,於是收緊政策.現在歸咎過早收緊政策是導致經濟在不到10年間二度陷入衰退深淵的原因,結果直到二戰開打前經濟都未擺脫衰退.
央行政策將繼續把焦點放在確立復甦,或許時間要較分析師預期還久.由於有這麼多的流動性四處流竄,很難抽回,研判未來兩三年共同因素將迫使商品價格同步上揚的投資人,或許看法是正確的.(完)

Lehman Anniversary: What's Different? What's Still the Same?

Lehman Anniversary: What's Different? What's Still the Same?

Overview: On the anniversary of the Lehman failure President Obama addresses Wall Street in order to build consensus for his administrations' regulatory reform plan. Banks are lobbying hard against the new consumer protection agency and Congress is slow in adapting proposed rules for a systemic risk regulator, or the regulatory regime for OTC derivatives, and a new non-bank resolution mechanism. At the international level, the G20 finance ministers reached a tentative agreement on September 5 (to be finalized by G20 leaders in Pittsburgh on September 24-25) on a review of capital requirements, the need for coordinated exit strategies, the adoption of macro-prudential policies, and eventually align remuneration incentives with the long-term performance of banks. There is also agreement international coordination with regard to OTC derivativesand hedge fund regulation as well as a consistent set of accounting rules.

What's Different?
* The Bank of International Settlements' comprehensive response to the global banking crisis which was formulated in response to the G20 finance ministers' agreement (September 7, 2009): Capital requirements will be strengthened across the board with systemic banks facing higher charges. A larger share of common equity will be mandated. Countercyclical reserve requirements will be mandated. A liquidity requirement will be considered, as will an overall leverage ratio. Risky trading activities will face higher capital charges as well as complex securities in order to minimize regulatory capital arbitrage.
* Moreover, the G20 finance ministers vowed to align remuneration incentives with the long-term performance of banks.
* OTC Derivatives Central Counterparties (CCP): There is new consensus that a central counterparty is necessary to reduce potential knock-on effects (systemic risk) from the failure of a large player. However, the riskiest products are not standardized enough for a clearinghouse and therefore remain exposed to bilateral counterparty risk which regulators want to mitigate by imposing higher capital charges and disclosure of aggregate position holdings.
* There is new recognition that derivatives can have an economic impact. Stanford Professor Darrell Duffie writes in a Pew research report that "at the bankruptcy of Lehman a large quantity of interest-rate swap hedges that had been provided by Lehman needed to be quickly replaced. Other dealers, themselves under financial stress, were willing to provide these hedges only at swap rates below government yields." (09/01/09) This led to the persisting negative swap spread phenomenon in the 30-year U.S. and other government bond markets, once considered a "mathematical impossibility" unless unsecured bilateral swaps were perceived as safer than government debt. A persistent negative basis was also observed in the corporate bond market. Analysts note that balance sheet constraints prevent market participants from arbitraging the price discrepancy away.
* Further transmission channels from derivatives to real economy include corporate credit lines which are increasingly based on CDS performance. This transmits counterparty risk inherent in the CDS premium to the corporate sector (cash spreads themselves measure credit and liquidity risk). This might systematically understate credit risk in normal times and overstate credit risk in times of stress, thus introducing procyclicality, according to an ECB report released in September 2009. Furthermore, there is the empty creditor phenomenon that provides "overhedged" bondholders with an incentive to push for bankruptcy instead of restructuring.
* A new paradigm of economic thought is voiced by economist Keiichiro Kobayash at VoxEU: "The existing theoretical structure of macroeconomics is incapable of addressing macroeconomic performance and the stability of the financial system in an integrated context." The author proposes a paradigm shift to explicitly include the financial sector, credit markets and asset/collateral prices in standard economic modeling.

What's Still the Same?
* Too big to fail banks are now even bigger and leverage has increased across the board. With the incorporation of insolvent competitors and the forced re-intermediation of formerly off-balance sheet vehicles, the leverage ratio of global banks has jumped to around 40-50 in the U.S., Europe, and the UK in 2008. (InvestorsInsight, 07/19/09) As of 2010, up to US$900 billion of remaining off-balance sheet vehicles will have to be consolidated.
* Meanwhile, systemic banks benefit from implicit and explicit government backstops, whereas a resolution regime for all systemically large and complex institutions a la Fannie and Freddie, for example--arguably one of the most important measures-- is stalling in Congress amid waning political support. (Dealbook, 09/08/09) There is strong lobbying against the Consumer Protection Agency, whose fate is unclear. It is not decided yet who will be the systemic risk regulator: the Fed or the Systemic Risk Council.
* The lack of any disciplining mechanism represents an incentive for large players to engage in risky trading activities with value-at-risk (VaR) measures back at record levels in Q2 2009 for the top five banks, with US$1.04 billion at risk to be lost at any given trading day. This "represents an 18% increase from a year earlier and is up 75% from the $592 million in the first half of 2007, according to regulatory filings." (WSJ, 09/09/09)
* August 2009 TARP Oversight Panel Report: Toxic assets are still on banks' books. They are likely to be found in the Level 3 accounting category (mark-to-model) due to valuation difficulties. As of Q1 2009, the large banks have US$657 billion of Level 3 assets on their books. Public-private investment program is poised to start in October 2009 but it is unclear if banks will want to sell despite the government subsidies, or if buyers will want to get involved in a government program.
* Commercial Real Estate (CRE) Risk: Fitch (via RiskCenter): "While CRE loans, excluding the more problematic construction and development portfolios, represent more than 125% of total equity for the 20 largest banks rated by Fitch, the risk is even higher for banks with less than $20 billion in assets, as average CRE exposure represents more than 200% of total equity for these institutions." (08/19/09) Fitch announces ratings review by September.
* Dependence on wholesale funding markets is likely to remain an issue. "In the year up to September 2009, Western banks have issued $645 billion of bonds without government guarantees, according to Dealogic, a research firm. But the idea that the banking system can improve its funding profile at the same time as it weans itself off explicit state guarantees looks wildly unrealistic. This partly reflects the sheer volumes of debt involved. As well as turning over existing short-term borrowings of some $18 trillion, Western banks have to refinance longer-term debts that are maturing at the rate of about $1.5 trillion a year. With securitization markets damaged (approximate funding hole of US$2 trillion) and confidence in banks battered, that will not be easy." (The Economist, 09/03/09)

Review

The large reliance on uninsured wholesale funding and the declining value of collateral led to immediate ripple effects in the already challenged repo market (see NBER report by Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick), and in the money market funds invested in Lehman's commercial paper (e.g. the Reserve Primary Fund.) Similarly, in the off-balance sheet universe, counterparty risk is measured by the replacement cost of bilateral hedges with another counterparty, minus any collateral posted. For example, the European Central Bank (ECB) reports that "as participants sought to replace terminated positions, [credit-default swaps] spreads widened by up to 40 basis points for investment-grade CDS and by around 100 basis points for sub-investment grade CDS." Re-hypothecated collateral proved in many cases difficult to access. AIG's total US$372 billion net protection seller position in the bespoke market (according to an AIG release via the ECB report, not captured in Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation data) shows the perils of credit-risk concentration due to one-way bets as compared to balanced bilateral exposures as is the norm for dealer banks. (The latter is shown for example in US$5.2 billion payout on US$72 billion of contracts with Lehman as a reference entity registered in the DTCC data warehouse; see FT, 09/11/09.) CDS are different from interest-rate derivatives in that the former are subject to jump-to-default risk (heavy right tails) (ECB). Recent research in network theory shows that sound CDS risk management by a central counterparty requires liquidity reserves proportional to gross rather than net exposures. (Rama Cont, Andreaa Minca & Amal Moussa, Columbia University)

Lehman's total assets in 2007 were US$691 billion. Of these, long positions in trading assets (45%) and short-term collateralized lending (44%, e.g. reverse repos) were the main positions. On the liabilities side, long-term debt (18%), equity (3%) and other short-term debt (8%) complemented short positions in trading (22%) and collateralized borrowing (37%). The remaining 12% were "payables," including the cash deposits of Lehman’s customers, especially its hedge fund clientele. ("Receivables" on the asset side were 6%.) "Hedge fund customers’ deposits are subject to withdrawal on demand, and proved to be an important source of funding instability," noted Tobias Adrian and Hyun Song Shin in a September 2009 Bank of France stability report.

2009年9月13日 星期日

薩默斯渴望重建美國經濟,需美元貶值助其一臂之力

12:38 14Sep09 RTRS-《Kimberley專欄》
(Neal Kimberley是路透外匯市場分析師.以下內容僅代表其個人觀點)
撰稿 Neal Kimberley 編譯 沈璐璐
路透倫敦9月11日電---外匯匯率可能就要使美國國家經濟委員會主任薩默斯的願望成真了.
在7月份的一次演講中,薩默斯表示隨著美國經濟復甦的推進,"重建的美國經濟必須更多地側重出口,減少以消費為導向;更注重環保,減輕對石化能源的依賴...不要一味關注收入增長,那樣僅會不均衡地對一小部分人有利."
我們再來看看本周出爐的美國7月貿易數據,看看是否和薩默斯的願望匹配.
出口連續第三個月上升,較6月上升2.2%至1,276億美元,對此薩默斯肯定喜笑顏開.
但另一方面,他希望看到美國經濟更少以消費為導向的願望則遭遇了挫折,因進口不僅連續第二個月增加,而且增幅達到4.7%,為歷來最快步伐.
"舊車換現金"計劃無疑在1,596億美元的進口額中起了重要作用,但美國人亦重新在各類消費品上大肆揮霍起來.
暫且不管他在能源上的雄心,因為這顯然是一個長期目標,而且石油進口價格和進口量雙雙上升,將被視作是經濟復甦的一部分.
讓我們先把目光放在其第一個願望上,鑒於美國的薪資水平,薩默斯如何能實現他想要的再平衡,投資者對此可能一頭霧水.
市場並不愚蠢,並且知道最簡單的途徑將是讓美元持續貶值.
鑒於美元的儲備貨幣地位,這種想法不太可能得到美國政府的公開贊同.因此在可預見的未來,美國會繼續堅持"強勢美元"政策.
事實上,市場在奉行薩默斯的願望上或許可以做得更多.
這可能對美英"特殊關係"沒什麼太大助益,但英鎊兌美元有很大上行空間,尤其是英國政府十分嫻熟地在2008年金融危機加劇時,放手讓英鎊下滑.
同樣地,歐元兌美元近幾年曾到過1.6000美元上方水準.歐元兌美元上看1.5000上方,或英鎊兌美元瞄準1.7000上方,並不需要投資者信心大增才能達到,因此市場市場確實能幫助美國實現更加"側重出口而非消費"的經濟.
美元兌日圓亦是如此.美元兌日圓在90日圓上方徘徊,仍有下行空間,走向87.00日圓或甚至85.00.
薩默斯的雄心同市場當前看空美元的觀點十分融洽.在這件事上,市場應會樂於幫他達成心願.(完)

2009年9月10日 星期四

《SAFT專欄》偉大的美國消費者就此長眠

(James Saft是路透專欄撰稿人,以下內容僅代表其個人觀點)
撰稿 James Saft 編譯 蔡美珍/王冠中
路透美國阿拉巴馬州9月10日電---安息吧,偉大的美國消費者.再也見不到和你們一樣的了.
撇開"舊車換現金"不談,消費者似乎鐵了心要償還債務,而非增加舉債,這種改變萬一持續下去(很可能如此),壓抑經濟成長的時間將是數年之久,而不只是幾個月,而且不只是美國受害.
根據聯邦儲備理事會(FED,美聯儲)本周公布的數據,7月美國消費者未還借款金額驚人地減少了216億美元,是分析師預估水準的五倍以上,創下二次世界大戰結束以來單月第二大減幅.
6月消費者信貸修正為減少155億美元,初值減少103億美元的表現原本已經夠可觀了.
過去一年來,消費者貸款未還餘額減少4.2%,等於減少將近1,100億美元,已經降至低於2007年危機爆發前的水準.
長期而言,這的確是必要的發展.房市及股市重挫,讓家庭財富嚴重受創,資產負債表失衡.再加上為數眾多的嬰兒潮世代即將步入退休年齡,支出和舉債原本就勢必會有所收斂.
問題在於這股儉約新趨勢會深入發展到何種程度.
"負債記憶的力量非常強大.成長於1920及1930年代的那一代民眾,對舉債感到害怕,因為他們及他們的父母經歷過兩次通縮期,"Lombard Street Research經濟分析師Gabriel Stein在致客戶報告中指出.
"我們現在再度處於償還債務及通縮時期.以為美國家庭會忘記2007-2009經驗,開始再像2000年代初期那樣舉債支出的想法,充其量只是幻想."
多年來,華爾街的金科玉律就是"千萬不要看衰美國消費者,"美國消費者的抗壓韌性極其驚人,簡直是超人.
戰爭和經濟衰退不容許進行消費以及隨之升高的債務.但911攻擊事件之後,借貸仍然出現不錯的月增幅.
整個產業都巴望著美國民眾繼續舉債支出.若要說全球經濟指望美國消費,而美國消費指望消費者舉債,這句話雖不中亦不遠矣.

**新節儉風潮**
無疑地,各類型放款機構都在緊縮信貸,但有不少證據顯示,民眾的習性也在改變.許多今年稍早由振興方案所取得的資金,都是用來償還債務,而非投入消費.
蓋洛普(Gallup)進行一項調查,詢問美國民眾過去一天的支出情況,該支出不包含重大採購或一般的家庭費用帳單,最新的數據為63美元,低於一年前的100美元.
單從數字來看,這樣的降幅有些言過其實.如果消費降幅這麼大,經濟會深陷蕭條,我們不可能還在討論復甦的力道.
蓋洛普的調查是由受訪者自我陳述,我猜現在大家都會誇大自己有多節儉,就如同過去大家可能會誇耀自己揮霍的程度.這是整體社會趨勢的重要指標.曾經你會希望蓋洛普知道你花錢有多大方,現在你可能希望他們認為你非常勤儉持家.
蓋洛普也將數據以世代來做分析,發現不是只有已退休或即將退休的人在削減支出.所謂X世代和千禧世代這些接替嬰兒潮世代進入勞動市場的人,也以類似的幅度在削減支出.
但重點不在存款率,而在於存款相較於負債的規模.儘管個人縮減支出並增加存款率不成問題,但這並不表示他們會突然成為有錢人.
另一項需注意的事情是,存款和資金流動可說天差地遠.某人或許可以迅速提高自己的存款率,目前也已見到這情況,但這並不意味著他能夠因此迅速清償債務.
根據舊金山聯邦儲備銀行的研究,如果美國消費者削減債務的速度能媲美日本企業在1990年代的償債速度,還是等得到2018年才能將債務相對於國內生產總值(GDP)的比例由目前的130%降到100%.
若消費者借貸的趨勢持續下去,相信不久後我們又得開始討論刺激政策、量化寬鬆和美國經濟再陷衰退.(完)

2009年9月9日 星期三

Key FX Themes into Year-End

1.Risky Asset Correlations Likely to Remain High

2.Still Constructive on the Cyclical Outlook
Combining this cyclical stance with high cross-asset correlations suggests that currencies such as the AUD and CAD, as well as the EUR and GBP, still have upside potential in the near term. The Yen, and in particular the Dollar, will likely face downside pressure on this basis. EM currencies, especially higher-yielding ones, should continue to do well, as expressed in our high-conviction EM Carry Top Trade.

3.Sequencing the Global Monetary Policy Tightening
With rising rates, carry differentials may well come into play among major currencies and this could further boost cyclical currencies. In some cases (such as with the AUD), expected policy tightening already appears to have become an important factor that signals further upside potential

4.Dollar Recovery? Not Yet!
In the near
term, we see the risks skewed towards some temporary
overshooting and can see EUR/$ testing the 1.50 area.

5.Seasonal Patterns into Year-End
Given that
manufacturing orders have started to bounce fairly strongly
recently, European exporters could find themselves falling
behind their hedging benchmarks. This could imply some
last-minute EUR/$ buying this year as well.

6.Becoming More Optimistic on CEE Currencies
The crisis hit credit-exposed Eastern Europe particularly
hard, arguably much more than other Emerging Market
regions. Even as global cyclical forces once again turn
supportive for risk taking, CEE assets continue to trade
with a higher risk premium.

7.FX Policy Events
In addition to the possible debate over fast-tracking EMU
entry in Eastern Europe, a few other events on the
schedule for FX policymakers are worth watching, in
particular:
  • The G20 summit on September 24-25 in Pittsburgh.
  • The Irish Lisbon Treaty referendum on October 2.
  • The G7 Finance Ministers meeting on October 3.
  • The IMF Annual Meeting in Turkey on October 3-5.
8.Growth Differentiation and Carry
we like
currencies with relatively high carry and with relatively
strong growth. Historically, both have performed very
well in a post-recession environment, where risk premia
are high, and rate differentials between EM and DM
remain relatively high, often to support nominal exchange
rate stability. However, given the correlation with cyclical
assets, we are keeping a close eye on equities.


GS Policy Rate Forecast

  • Australia 3.00 Hike in Q4 2009 (50bp, and then increments of 50bp every quarter till Q3 2010, 25bp in Q4 2010)
  • Canada 0.25 Hike in Q3 2010 (75bp, and then another 50bp in Q4 2010)
  • Euroland 1.00 Hike in Q3 2010 (25bp, and then another 25bp in Q4 2010)
  • Japan 0.10 Unchanged
  • New Zealand 2.50 Hike in Q2 2010 (25bp, then another 50bp in Q3 2010, 50bp in Q4 2010)
  • Norway 1.25 Hike in Q4 2009 (50bp, and then increments of 50bp every quarter till 2010)
  • Sweden 0.25 Hike in Q3 2010 (75bp, then 100bp in Q4 2010)
  • Switzerland 0.38 Unchanged
  • UK 0.50 Hike in Q1 2010 (100bp, then 50bp hike every quarter)
  • USA 0.15 Unchanged